

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM



CIA/RR CB 65-71

November 1965

Copy No. 212

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE ZAMBIA RESCUE OPERATION

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Research and Reports

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

W A R N I N G

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
OF THE ZAMBIA RESCUE OPERATION*

In the emotional aftermath of Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda may feel compelled to precipitate a complete economic break with Rhodesia. Although it is less likely, initiative for such a break could come from Rhodesia. An accumulation of actions and reactions could bring about a complete severing of all economic ties between the two countries. However this break comes about, the consequences for Zambia would be serious. One result of cutting the economic ties between Rhodesia and Zambia would be the elimination of most of the 700,000 short tons (st) of copper from world markets otherwise expected in the next year because of the heavy dependence of Zambian copper production on Rhodesian coal and electric power and because the major rail link to Zambia is through Rhodesia. Such an eventuality would pose difficult adjustment problems for much of the industrialized West because copper is already in short supply. The pound sterling, under these conditions, would probably come under severe pressure because of the importance of Zambian copper to British export industries.

There is no way in the short run by which the United States or the United Kingdom could offset the major consequences for Zambia of such a breakdown. Three economic and financial problems would be created immediately. First, the Free World need for Zambian copper is critical, and efforts would have to be made to continue production. The remaining limited supplies of copper from other Free World producers would have to be rationed. Second, the Zambian economy would have to be kept afloat at some minimum level and its dominant mining sector kept functioning, at least on a care-and-maintenance basis. Finally, the financial loss to the United Kingdom (estimated by the British at between US \$400 million and \$700 million annually) would have to be eased in order to maintain the stability of the pound sterling.

1. Rhodesia's Economic Stranglehold

Zambia's economic dependence on goods and services provided by Rhodesia is almost complete. In order to maintain economic activity at anything like the present levels, Zambia must have access to Mozambique's Indian Ocean ports via Rhodesia, an uninterrupted flow of electricity from the jointly owned Kariba power complex, and a continuous supply of coal from Rhodesia's Wankie fields. Rail and road

* The estimates and conclusions in this brief represent the best judgment of this Office as of 23 November 1965.

routes to the sea, other than those transiting Rhodesia, are available to Zambia. However, they collectively lack the capacity to offset the loss of access to the Rhodesian system. Zambia's embryonic coal industry, under the most optimistic assumptions, could provide only a small fraction of the coal Zambia would require if it is denied Wankie coal. Although there is substantial unused thermal electric generating capacity in Zambia, power generation from these plants would necessarily depend on imported coal, and in any event Zambian generating stations could not offset the loss of Kariba power.

2. Copper Production*

With the exception of a modest amount of electric power imported from Katanga, Zambia's annual production of some 700,000 st of copper depends completely on electricity supplied from Kariba and on electricity generated in Zambia's thermal powerplants, which use Rhodesian coal. Substantial additional amounts of Wankie coal are consumed in processing Zambian copper concentrates through the blister stage. Without these supplies, it would not be possible to maintain production at 700,000 st, and output would fall sharply. The limiting factor in the first instance is the capacity of the Zambian thermal powerplants. Although these plants now operate only intermittently, they could produce at capacity 1.13 billion kilowatt-hours per year. In addition, 400 million kilowatt-hours probably can be imported per year from Katanga. Because of line losses and municipal and other uses, the net electric power available to the copper companies annually would be about 1.1 billion kilowatt-hours. This amount of power would allow the mines to produce annually about 450,000 st of blister copper or 400,000 st of electrolytic copper. The coal required for this level of copper production would be about 1.5 million st -- 775,000 st to generate domestic power, 400,000 st to smelt the copper, and about 325,000 st to operate the railroad within Zambia to service this level of economic activity. Such a rate of production would be dependent, however, on the physical ability to import this amount of coal in addition to the other mining supplies and foodstuffs necessary to maintain the population at a level of austerity. The importation of such quantities of coal into Zambia is not believed to be possible.

3. Austerity in Zambia**

At the current level of economic activity, Zambia imports about 2 million st of goods annually. To maintain the Zambian economy at

* For details on required inputs of electric power, see Appendix A.

** For details on inputs necessary to sustain the Zambian economy at austerity levels, see Appendix B.

an austerity level and to keep the mining industry on a care-and-maintenance basis, it is estimated that imports could be reduced to about 900,000 st as follows:

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Thousand Short Tons</u>
Coal	415
POL	150
Food	140
Other	190

This estimate of coal requirements assumes a doubling of imports of Katangan power to 400 million kilowatt-hours annually, and hence is probably conservative. The estimate of coal imports could be reduced if Zambia's own fields at Kandabwe could begin significant production. Conflicting estimates suggest that Kandabwe could produce at an annual rate of between 200,000 and 400,000 st. Depending on the level of Kandabwe production (and the present level is negligible), the volume of all imports needed to sustain the economy on a care-and-maintenance basis would total between 500,000 and 700,000 st annually.

4. Transport Alternatives*

In the final analysis the controlling factor limiting the effectiveness of any Zambia rescue operation will be the availability of transport capacity on routes which avoid Rhodesia. The three possibilities are rail, road, and air, which in turn are limited primarily by port capacity in East Africa. The estimated excess inbound capacity of all roads from Zambia to Tanzanian Indian Ocean ports is about 100,000 st annually.

[REDACTED] suggests that ^{25X6} 100,000 st per year is the maximum that can be carried, using readily available aircraft and without time-consuming improvements to East African airports. In addition, by using the East African railroad system, another 100,000 st can be made available to Zambia. Thus the combined inbound rail, road, and airlift capacity through Tanzania is 300,000 st per year. The rail-river transport system through Congo (Leopoldville) might also carry an additional 100,000 st of inbound cargo.

The only major rail route from Zambia to the sea that does not pass through Rhodesia is the Benguela Railroad through Portuguese Angola. The surplus capacity of this wood-burning railroad is subject to considerable conjecture, but it is probably at least 600,000 st -- 400,000 st inbound toward Zambia and 200,000 st outbound.

* For details on transport facilities, see Appendix C.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Theoretically, Zambia would be able to draw on a total inbound capacity by rail, road, river, and air of about 800,000 st. Katanga, however, would very likely have first call on the surplus inbound capacity of the Benguela Railroad to offset the 450,000 st of goods now imported through Rhodesia, including 300,000 st of Wankie coal and 150,000 st of general merchandise, and thus would more than offset the available surplus inbound capacity.

As indicated above, under favorable circumstances, between 500,000 and 700,000 st of imports annually are required to support Zambia on a care-and-maintenance basis. If only 300,000 st of imports are available through Tanzania and an additional 100,000 st through the Congo (Leopoldville), it is apparent that it would be virtually impossible to support Zambia adequately, even at a sharply reduced level of economic activity.

It is possible that the report of the railroad expert now investigating the Benguela route will increase the current estimate of surplus capacity available on this route. However, the upward revision of capacity would have to be very large to alter the conclusions of this brief substantially.

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX A

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON THE MAXIMUM PRODUCTION
OF ZAMBIAN COPPER
BY AVAILABILITY OF ELECTRIC POWER

The availability of electric power in Zambia places rigid limitations on copper production. The maximum quantity of Zambian copper which can be produced in the absence of Kariba power and Wankie coal from Rhodesia has been estimated in the following fashion. It was assumed that all Zambian thermal powerplants will operate at full capacity and that the availability of coal will not be a limiting factor. Furthermore, the present import of 200 million kilowatt-hours of electricity from Katanga was doubled to 400 million kilowatt-hours. Allowing for various losses and other essential uses, it was estimated that Zambia would have access to 1.1 billion kilowatt-hours annually under these maximum assumptions. Using the experience factors below, it was determined that a maximum of 450,000 st of blister copper could be produced if refining facilities were shut down to conserve electricity. If refining were carried on, only 400,000 st of electrolytically refined copper could be produced.

The estimated electric power requirements in Zambia per short ton of refined copper are as follows*:

	<u>Kilowatt-Hours</u> <u>per Short Ton</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Mining	795	29.2
Concentrating	1,270	46.7
Smelting and converting	205	7.5
Electrolytic refining	180	6.6
Auxiliary shops	270	10.0
Total	<u>2,720</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Thus the tonnage of copper that can be produced is derived by dividing the amount of power available by 2,720 kilowatt-hours. This

* Thirty-nine short tons of ore are required to recover one short ton of refined copper.

S-E-C-R-E-T

will give the amount of electrolytic (refined) copper that can be produced. To arrive at an estimate for smelter (blister) copper, 180 kilowatt-hours per st were subtracted, thus further reducing the power input required by using a slightly lower figure for the needs of auxiliary shops.

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX B


MINIMUM INPUTS NECESSARY
TO SUSTAIN THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY AT AUSTERITY LEVELS
AND THE MINING INDUSTRY
ON A CARE-AND-MAINTENANCE BASIS
AND MAXIMUM TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE

Under the assumption that Rhodesia cuts off supplies of electric power from Kariba, halts shipments of Wankie coal, and denies Zambia the use of rail transit facilities, the estimated annual imports necessary for maintenance of the Zambian mines and a minimum level of other economic activities are as follows:

	<u>Thousand Short Tons</u>
Coal	415
POL, food, and other	480
Total	<u>900 (rounded)</u>

Potential domestic production of fuel amounts to 200,000 to 400,000 st, leaving a deficit of 500,000 to 700,000 st that would have to be met by imports. Available inbound transport capacity, however, amounts to only 400,000 st, leaving an import shortfall of 100,000 to 300,000 st.

In order to provide for care and maintenance of the mines and to provide a minimum level of other activity, this Office estimates that 415,000 st of coal per year would be required. Other estimates of these requirements are as follows:

	<u>Thousand Short Tons</u> <u>per Year</u>
	780
Mining company a/	770
Mining company official a/	432
Ex-adviser to President Kaunda a/	360

a. These estimates include care and maintenance of the mines and only a small portion of the coal needed for other essential activities.

25X6 A mining company official estimated that 100 megawatts of power capacity is needed for the care and maintenance of all Zambian copper mines. A large portion of these needs can be imported from hydroelectric facilities in Congo (Leopoldville). The estimates of the ability of Congo (Leopoldville) to make power capacity available, however, have ranged from 40 to 100 megawatts. The midpoint of these estimates, 70 megawatts, is used. Coal requirements of 130,000 st needed to convert the remaining 30 megawatt capacity into electrical output is obtained by applying factors developed in Appendix C. Municipal needs and line losses in 1964 totaled 250 million kilowatt-hours. Coal inputs of 200,000 st needed to generate this output is obtained by applying the fuel consumption/power production ratio derived in Appendix C. This coal figure is for present consumption; therefore, 135,000 st of coal, [REDACTED] is used here to indicate a lower level of activities. The railroads will need 150,000 st of coal, assuming a much reduced level of activity.

In addition to coal, estimated annual Zambian import requirements for a minimum level of economic activities are as follows:

	<u>Thousand Short Tons</u>
Food	140
POL	150
Other	190
Total	<u>480</u>

25X6 [REDACTED]

Some domestic fuel production is possible. Zambia plans to extract coal starting in early 1966 from the Kandabwe coalfield. Annual production is projected at 180,000 st. Emergency deliveries in amounts up to 360,000 st yearly may be available. Both of these estimates are believed to be overly optimistic, however. An additional 20,000 to 40,000 st of coal-equivalent in cordwood for use in thermal powerplants has been included to give a range of 200,000 to 400,000 st for domestic fuel supplies.

The estimated annual inbound transportation capacity is as follows:

	<u>Thousand Short Tons</u>
Benguela Railroad	400
Through Tanzania by road, rail, and airlift	300
Congo (Leopoldville), Katanga to Matadi	100
Maximum excess capacity available	<u>800</u>

The Congo (Leopoldville) mining industry, which is the main user of the Benguela route, probably would absorb all this line's excess capacity in order to replace lost tonnages imported via Rhodesian Railways. Thus the remaining maximum inbound capacity available to Zambia is 400,000 st and includes the 300,000 st shipped via Tanzania and the 100,000 st transported from Katanga to Matadi.

Other estimates of the capacity of the Benguela Railroad are as follows:

	<u>Thousand Short Tons</u>
Report of transportation experts to the Zambian government	300
Official of the Benguela Railroad	900
Financial Mail, Lusaka	276
Transportation experts from Brookings Institute	144
	1,200

25X6

Rail, road, and airlift capacity through Tanzania was estimated at 300,000 st. (This volume is limited by the cargo-handling capacity of the Tanzanian ports.) A report to the Zambian government by transportation experts estimated that no inbound capacity existed via Tanzania and added that none existed from Congo (Leopoldville) to Matadi.

APPENDIX C

MAXIMUM ELECTRIC POWER AVAILABLE
TO THE ZAMBIAN COPPER INDUSTRY
AND THE NECESSARY COAL INPUT

If Rhodesia cuts off supplies of electric power from Kariba, it is estimated that Zambian thermal powerplants which service the copper-belt can generate power at the rate of 1,130 million kilowatt-hours per year. In addition it is assumed that 400 million kilowatt-hours can be imported from Congo (Leopoldville). Of this total of 1,530 million kilowatt-hours, 430 million will be consumed by municipalities and by line loss, leaving 1,100 million kilowatt-hours available for the copper mines. It is also estimated that about 775,000 short tons of coal are needed by Zambian thermal powerplants to generate 1,130 million kilowatt-hours.

Current maximum electric power obtainable from Zambian thermal powerplants is determined by applying the 1954 operating factor (when these plants were operating near capacity) to the present capacity. Thus in 1954, thermal powerplants servicing the Zambian copperbelt had a capacity of 168.2 megawatts and an output of 904 million kilowatt-hours. The generating plants, therefore, operated 5,375 hours that year. The present capacity of 205 megawatts multiplied by a rounded operating factor of 5,500 hours yields an annual output of 1,130 million kilowatt-hours.

The 1954 fuel input for Zambian thermal powerplants on the copper-belt is shown below in terms of coal equivalents:

	<u>Thousand Short Tons</u>
Coal	354
Cordwood	232
Wasteheat steam	139
Oil	5
Total	<u>730</u>

S-E-C-R-E-T

Coal requirements of 912,000 short tons were determined by applying the above fuel consumption/power production ratio to the estimated maximum thermal generating output. Wasteheat steam from the copper smelters represents the equivalent of 139,000 short tons of coal. Thus about 775,000 short tons of coal would be needed to reach maximum output.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

25X1A ☐

SERIES NUMBER		CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	DISTRIBUTION TO RC	
CIA/RR CB 65-71		Secret/No Foreign Dissem	43	
DATE OF DOCUMENT		NUMBER OF COPIES	NUMBER IN RC	
November 1965		300		
COPY NO. (S)	RECIPIENT	DATE		
		SENT	RETURNED	
1	DD/ORR	24 Nov 65	2 Dec 65	
2-13, 16-19	O/DDI (See attached memos) 25X1A	"		
14	[REDACTED] SA/RR	"	26 Nov 65	
15	[REDACTED] D/I 25X1A	"		
20	D/ORR	"		
14	[REDACTED] St/P 25X1A	29 Nov 65		
176	CGS/HR/Ops, 1G81 25X1A	"		
177	[REDACTED] OCR	"	1 Dec 65	
178	[REDACTED] 25X1C			
179	[REDACTED] 25X1A			
240	[REDACTED] OCT	1 Dec 65		
237-239	[REDACTED] I/AF	"		
180-199	See attached memo (State Dist)	1 Dec 65		
200	CGS/RE	1 Dec 65		
27	Rec'd from Ch/E	2 Dec 65		
55	Rec'd from D/AF	2 Dec 65		
80	Rec'd from DCS/SD	2 Dec 65		
54	Rec'd from D/AF	8 Dec 65		
177	Ch/E	8 Dec 65		
35	[REDACTED] 25X1A	9 Dec 65		
201	Philip Allen, State	10 Dec 65		
202	Mr. Robert S. Douglas, State	10 Dec 65		
203-207	[REDACTED]	10 Dec 65		
208	[REDACTED]	17 Dec 65	25X1C	
226	[REDACTED]	20 "		
239	Hand-carried to Fred Heddel, State	10 Jan 66	25X1A	
	Rest - [REDACTED] I/AF		25X1A	
209	[REDACTED] via SA/RC	10 Feb 66		
235	[REDACTED] via SA/RR	16 Feb 66	25X1C	
253	Rec'd from T/TF	8 Mar 66		
234	John Marlin Federal Reserve Board	9 May 66		
210	[REDACTED] via [REDACTED] CS/CR	11 Jul 66	25X1A	
202-233	[REDACTED] OTR	16 Aug 66	25X1A	
253, 154, 5027	[REDACTED]			
211	[REDACTED] N PIC/REF	9 May 67	25X1A	
213-221	Destroyed	17 Jan 68		

COPY
NO. (3)

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

RECIPIENT

DATE

SENT

RETURNED

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

SECRET


Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

St/A/DS Distribution of Current Support Brief No. 65-71. The Economic Dimensions of the Zambia Rescue Operation -- November 1965 (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>
21-25	O/DDI, Room 7E32, Hq.
6X 26	O/DDI, [REDACTED] 25X1A
7X	XXXXXXXX
8X	XXXXXXXX
9X	XXXXXXXX
10X 27	Ch/E
241-243	D/ONE
244-249	St/CS
2XX 250	St/PR
251-257	D/T (1 each branch)
28 - 34	D/R (1 each branch)
35	MRA & St/PS
36 - 40	D/P (1 each branch)
41 - 46	D/F (1 each branch)
4XX	XXXXXX
48 - 53	D/I (1 each branch)
54 - 58	D/A (1 each branch)
59 - 60	GD/OBI
61 - 62	CD/OBI
63	CD/X/OBI
64 - 69	RID/SS/DS, Unit 4, Room 1B4004, Hq.
70	St/P/A
71	St/FM
72	Analyst/Branch [REDACTED] I/AF)
73	GR/CR
74	BR/CR
75	FIB/SR/CR, Room 1G27, Hq.
76	Library/CR
77	IPI/CR
78	Archival File - <i>Records Center</i>
79	Chief, OCR/FDD
80	DCS/SD
81	OCI/SA/R, Room 5G19, Hq.
82	DDI/CGS, Room 7G00, Hq.
83 - 84	DDI/CGS/HR, Room 7G00, Hq.
85	DDI/RS, Room 4G39, Hq.

Approved For Release 2001/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002400210001-1

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

<u>Copy No.</u>	<u>Recipient</u>	
86 - 88	D/OSI	
89	D/OBI	
90	DD/S&T/SpINT	
91 - 92	OTR/IS/IP, Room 532, 1000 Glebe (1 - OTR/SIC)	25X1A
93	NPIC/CSD/REF, Room 1S518, [REDACTED]	
94	NSAL, Room 3W136, Ft. Meade (via GB31, Hq.)	
95 - 103	OCI Internal (via [REDACTED] SDS/DD/OCR)	25X1A
104 - 112	NSA [REDACTED] (via GB31, Hq.)	
113 - 114	National Indications Center, Room 1E821, Pentagon	25X1A
115 - 126	State, INR Communications Center, Room 6527, State Dept. Bldg.	
127 - 130	USIA, IRS/A, Room 1002, 1750 - Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Attn: Warren Phelps	
131 - 175	Defense Intelligence Agency, DIAAQ-3, A Building, Arlington Hall Station	
47, 176 - 240 258-300	St/P/C/RR, Room 4F41, Hq. (<i>held in St/P/C - 29 Nov 65</i>) Records Center	

SECRET

1 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Dissemination Control Branch, DD/CR
FROM : Chief, Publications Staff, ORR
SUBJECT : Transmittal of Material

It is requested that the attached copies of CIA/RR CB 65-71, The Economic Dimensions of the Zambia Rescue Operation, November 1965, Secret/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, be forwarded as follows:

State, INR Communications Center,
Room 6527, State Dept. Bldg.
Suggested distribution for
Embassies in Lisbon, London,
Yaounde, Leopoldville, Addis Ababa,
Accra, Abidjan, Nairobi, Monrovia,
Tripoli, Rabat, Lagos, Mogadiscio,
Khartoum, Tunis, Pretoria, Algiers,
Cotonou, Dakar, and Bamako

25X1A

Attachments: 20

Copies #180 - #199 of CB 65-71

cc: CGS/RB (with Copy No. 200 of CB 65-71)

ACTION COMPLETED

The dissemination requested by
this memorandum has been completed.

BY: *sy*

Date: *6 Dec 65*

SECRET



SECRET

20

Project No. 48.5290

Report Series CIA/RR CB 65-71

Title: The Economic Dimensions of the Zambia Rescue Operation --
November 1965 (Secret/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Responsible Analyst and Branch [REDACTED] I/AF 25X1A

RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION TO STATE POSTS

<u>Bloc</u>	<u>Far East</u>	<u>ARA</u>
Berlin, Germany	Bangkok, Thailand	Mexico
Bucharest, Romania	Djakarta, Indonesia	Guatemala
Budapest, Hungary	Hong Kong	Panama
Moscow, USSR	Rangoon, Burma	Brazillia, Brazil
Prague, Czechoslovakia	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya	Buenos Aires, Argentina
Sofia, Bulgaria	Saigon, Vietnam	Bogota, Colombia
Warsaw, Poland	Seoul, Korea	Santigao, Chile
	Singapore, British Malaya	La Paz, Bolivia
	Taipei, Formosa	Montevideo, Uruguay
	Tokyo, Japan	Caracas, Venezuela
	Vientiane, Laos	
	Colombo, Ceylon	
<u>Europe</u>	<u>Near East & South Asia</u>	<u>Africa</u>
Belgrade, Yugoslavia	Ankara, Turkey	A aoude, Cameroun
Bern, Switzerland	Athens, Greece	L éopoldville, Congo
Bonn, Germany	Cairo, Egypt	A ddis Ababa, Ethopia
Brussels, Belgium	Damascus, Syria	A ccra, Ghana
Copenhagen, Denmark	Kabul, Afghanistan	A bidjan, Ivory Coast
Geneva, Switzerland	Karachi, Pakistan	N airobi, Kenya
Helsinki, Finland	New Delhi, India	M onrovia, Liberia
The Hague, Netherlands	Nicosia, Cyprus	T ripoli, Libya
L isbon, Portugal	Tehran, Iran	R abat, Morocco
L ondon, England	Baghdad, Iraq	L agos, Nigeria
Luxembourg, Luxembourg	Tel Aviv, Israel	M ogadiscio, Somal
Madrid, Spain	Beirut, Lebanon	K hartoum, Sudan
Oslo, Norway	Amman, Jordon	T unis, Tunisia
Paris, France	Jidda, Saudi Arabia	P retoria, South Africa
Rome, Italy		A lgiers, Algeria
Stockholm, Sweden		C otonou, Dahomey
Vienna, Austria		D akar, Senegal
		B amako, Mali
<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Ottawa, Canada</u>	
Wellington, New Zealand		
Manila, Philippines		
Canberra, Australia		
Melbourne, Australia		

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification